A New Direction for US Climate Policy A New Direction for US Climate Policy:
Assessing the First 100 Days of Donald Trump's Presidency
Michael Mehling* Following his surprise election, President Trump has translated several campaign promises into a relentless progression of executive measures. This article traces the first 100 days of his presidency as they relate to climate and energy policy, assessing the impact of personnel choices, his regulatory reform agenda, and his proposed budget blueprint, as well as executive or agency orders across various sectors. It also differentiates between the expected impact of federal policy choices and fundamental trends in the energy sector as well as the activist role of states and municipalities in shaping climate policy outcomes. Finally, the article discusses procedural constraints and judicial review as moderating forces, limiting the scale and speed with which the new president can overturn the climate legacy of his predecessor. In the end, the article argues that a retrospective of recent administrations reveals a cyclical pattern which both confines and perpetuates the alternating extremes of successive presidencies.
I. Background
On 20 January 2017, Donald J Trump ascended to the highest office in the United States (US), the presidency. His surprising victory in the Electoral College -which portends a major ideological shift in American energy and environmental policy -has been met with significant concern in the environmental community both domestically and abroad. During an acrimonious and controversial election season, he repeatedly vowed to overturn the climate legacy of his predecessor, Barack H Obama, citing doubts about the very existence of climate change 1 and arguing that related policy measures were harming the US economy and destroying jobs. Still, given that he had at one point expressed support for robust climate action, 2 it initially remained unclear to what extent the conflicting remarks Trump made during the campaign would also shape his executive decisions once he assumed office. As the first 100 days of his presidency come to a close, however, a number of early policy steps provide a growing body of evidence for the policy vision of the new administration -and this vision is remarkably aligned with candidate Trump's campaign rhetoric in recent years.
Many of the central pillars of this vision can be traced back to a campaign speech the candidate held before a an annual petroleum conference in Bismarck, North Dakota, on 26 May 2016. On this occasion, he outlined the contours of his 'America First Energy Plan', which included immediate steps to rescind 1 On 6 November 2012, Donald J Trump famously tweeted: 'The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive', followed by several tweets in 2013 and 2014 describing climate change as a 'hoax'; on 2 January 2014, he reacted to cold weather by tweet pointments to lead the transition at key government agencies suggested an uncompromising hostility towards environmental safeguards, and to climate policy in particular. 4 Fears that President Trump would undo years of progress on climate policy received further impetus when he announced his designated cabinet, with a number of prospective members who have long ties to the fossil fuel industry or a track record of opposing government action on climate change. In the meantime, the cabinet has been confirmed, including the following heads of federal departments and agencies with responsibility for climate policy:
• E Scott Pruitt, the former Attorney General for Oklahoma, as Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). During the presidency of Barack Obama, Pruitt sued the EPA in over a dozen cases, repeatedly questioning the scientific threat and seriousness of climate change and the need for federal climate action. 5 Extensive correspondence released after a court order revealed close coordination of his office with major oil, gas and coal producers, electric utilities and other industry groups. 6 Since his appointment, Pruitt has indicated his intention to promote an agenda of 'originalism' at the EPA, reversing 'regulatory assault' on industry and devolving authority to the states.
7
• J Richard Perry, Tillerson himself has affirmed the scientific consensus on climate change and endorsed policy action, the company he formerly led is under investigation for potentially misleading consumers and investors about the risks of climate change.
9
• Ryan Zinke, former Navy SEAL and a Member of the US House of Representatives for Montana, as Secretary of the Interior, heading a department with oversight over the use of federal lands, including oil, gas and coal extraction. Zinke has wavered in his affirmation of climate change and support for climate action. 
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Less than 100 days into the new presidency, the White House has already mandated a review or rescission of several federal climate policies. Few of these orders have immediate effect, however, requiring observance of lengthy administrative procedures which, in turn, will be vulnerable to litigation by states and environmental advocacy groups. It also remains unclear whether executive action can halt or reverse dynamics that are primarily driven by state and local policies and market fundamentals. Whether or not President Trump can, thus, use a reversal of climate policy progress under his predecessor to advance his declared objective of deconstructing the 'administrative state', as his Chief Strategist Stephen K Bannon has framed it, 17 remains to be seen. All the main actions taken by the administration since the inauguration are described in the following section, and the impacts they are likely to have are then discussed in a concluding section.
II. Actions by the Administration and 115 th Congress

Regulatory Reform
An early harbinger of the regulatory reform agenda of the new administration was promptly unveiled on inauguration day, when the White House Chief of Staff Reinhold R Priebus issued a memorandum to all agencies ordering a regulatory freeze and requir- 
Energy Sector
Several measures adopted at the outset of the new administration share one central objective: to reduce the regulatory burden on oil, gas and coal production. Collectively, they recalibrate the balance of environmental and economic interests in the energy sector, as repeatedly pledged during the election campaign. Already in February, the Interior Department suspended 49 and then, in April, formally proposed repealing 50 a revised accounting system to govern how oil and gas produced from federal leases is valued. A New Direction for US Climate Policy lier pipeline approval, this decision builds on extensive environmental reviews, yet both pipeline projects remain highly politicised due to their potential impacts on water resources and the climate, as well as alleged violations of indigenous and tribal rights. Litigation against the approval decisions is already underway.
63
Additional directives relevant to the energy sector, affecting restrictions on coal, oil and gas production on federal lands as well as curbs on methane emissions from hydrocarbon activities, were included in a sweeping Executive Order released in late March 2017. Because this Executive Order primarily aims at rolling back a body of rules issued in recent years to address climate change, but also sets out some overarching principles and procedures, the constituent provisions will be discussed in concert in the following section. In terms of substance, the Executive Order consists of a number of directives to executive departments and agencies aimed at suspending, revising, or rescinding regulations that 'unduly burden the development of domestic energy resources beyond the degree necessary to protect the public interest or otherwise comply with the law'.
Climate Change
70 It goes on to detail a process requiring agencies to immediately review and identify 'all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources', and solicits each agency to submit within specified timelines a plan for this review as well as, subsequently, a report describing recommended actions. 
83 Methane, the main constituent of natural gas, has a significantly higher global warming potential than carbon dioxide, and its share in US GHG emissions is rising due to increased emissions from oil production as well as the production, processing, transmission and storage of natural gas. 84 Among the regulations affected by the Executive Order is a rule that sets out performance standards for new, modified and reconstructed facilities in the oil and gas sector, defining best practices for monitoring and detecting leaks, preventing emissions and capturing fugitive gas. 85 In early April, the EPA published a notice announcing that it is reviewing and, if appropriate, will initiate proceedings to suspend, revise or rescind that rule. 86 Earlier in the year, the EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards had already withdrawn an Information Collection Request (ICR) for methane emissions from the oil and gas industry, part of efforts by the previous administration to develop standards for natural gas leakage and flaring from existing facilities. 87 A second regulation explicitly mentioned in the Executive Order seeks to curb methane waste from oil and natural gas development on federal land, and specifies limitations on gas flaring, improved leak detection and capture, and venting requirements. 88 To date, the administration has not issued a notice announcing a review of this rule, but on 3 February 2017, the House of Representatives passed a resolution to repeal it using the CRA. 89 A corresponding Senate resolution is still required before the disapproval can be submitted to the President for signature.
With the Executive Order, the new administration is also targeting executive and agency actions restricting the production of coal, oil, natural gas and shale energy. In particular, it instructs the Secretary of the Interior to amend or withdraw a Secretarial Order issued under the previous administration which called for a programmatic environmental review and modernisation of the federal coal leasing programme, and imposed a moratorium on federal land coal leasing based thereon. 
102
Despite the sweeping scope of this Executive Order, the next section will argue that it may ultimately remain a symbolic measure by the administration that is likely to suffer lengthy procedural and judicial delays, its effectiveness limited by market dy- 99 Especially if international impacts are disregarded and a higher discount rate applies, as the Executive Order indicates; the conventional approach to cost-benefit estimates described in the OMB guidance document focuses on domestic impacts and excludes damages that are incurred outside the US, whereas the IWG that elaborated the social cost of carbon decided that, because climate change is a global concern, global impacts would be taken into account.
100 Executive Order 13783 (n 64) s 3(c). III. Analysis
Means as an End: Procedural Inertia and Litigation
As outlined in the preceding section, executive action taken so far by the current administration on climate change has a clear center of gravity on unravelling policies set in place by the previous administration. Even where those policies were implemented by way of agency regulations rather than statutory legislation, which -given the partisan rift on climate change in both chambers of Congress -is the case with a majority of climate measures taken during the presidency of Barack Obama, repealing his climate legacy will not be an expeditious and straightforward process. Alternative pathways exist to undo the current climate policy framework, but each is subject to detailed procedural requirements and constraints. For regulatory action taken within 60 legislative days of the end of the last congressional session, the CRA allows Congress to pass a joint resolution with simple majority votes in both chambers to 'disapprove' regulatory action taken during the first 75 days of the next session.
103 To date, the 115 th Congress has successfully applied this process with greater frequency than any previous Congress since enactment of the provision over two decades ago.
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Once disapproved, the CRA also prohibits reissuing the rule in substantially the same form or issuing a new rule that is substantially the same, 'unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.' 105 Despite its conclusive effect, the applicability of this process is limited: only agency rules finalised by the previous administration on or after 13 June 2016 can be subjected to the expedited review, 106 and the opportunity to do so will close once the 115 th Congress exceeds 75 days in session. After that, Congress can still pass substantive legislation to repeal or revise agency rules or indeed the legislation that sets out the rulemaking authority underlying such rules. In both cases, howev- mean that the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, building a robust record of scientific, economic, and other supporting information. In order to rescind the Clean Power Plan, for instance, the EPA would have to establish that rescission of the rule is not contrary to the Clean Air Act, is reasonable, and does not endanger public health or welfare. As long as the endangerment finding for GHG emissions 116 adopted during the previous administration remains in place -and none of the executive actions of the current administration have suggested repealing it, a process that would entail its own challenges 117 -the EPA would have to establish new emission guidelines, although it could then assume a more modest 110 EPA, 'Review of the Clean Power Plan' (n 82); guiding principles the EPA will apply include: determining whether the Clean Power Plan is appropriately grounded in EPA's statutory authority and consistent with the rule of law; whether it appropriately promotes cooperative federalism and respects the authority and powers that are reserved to the states; whether it effects the administration's dual goals of protecting public health and welfare while also supporting economic growth and job creation; whether it appropriately maintains the diversity of reliable energy resources and encourages the production of domestic energy sources to achieve energy independence and security; and whether the rule and alternative approaches will provide benefits that substantially exceed their costs. and thus failing judicial scrutiny. 120 Only if a federal court rules that the EPA lacks authority to regulate GHG emissions from existing sources -an argument cited by several petitioners in litigation to set aside the Clean Power Plan 121 -would a rescission without replacement be admissible, yet it would still not affect the obligation of the EPA to address emissions from new stationary sources and mobile sources.
Where regulations are currently subject to pending litigation, as is the case with the Clean Power Plan, the administration effectively has an additional venue to stall or repeal climate regulations. Within months of its release, the Clean Power Plan became the most heavily litigated federal environmental regulation in US history, 122 with lawsuits from -at one point -27 states as well as countless other petitioners, such as energy companies and local electric utilities, rural electric cooperatives, labour unions, industry and trade associations, and additional stakeholders challenging the legality of the rule and accusing the administration of regulatory overreach; meanwhile, a large number of intervenors and amici curi- Order affords the Attorney General discretion to request a stay of the litigation or seek other appropriate relief pending reconsideration of the Clean Power Plan by the EPA.
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On the same day as the Executive Order was signed, the administration filed a motion with the court to hold litigation against the rule in abeyance pending administrative action, asking for a standstill 'until 30 days after the conclusion of review and any resulting forthcoming rulemaking.'
128 Such a voluntary remand could be denied by the court, however, which might allow the case to continue on its merits until formal withdrawal of the contested rule. Alternatively, the new administration could have admitted error and asked the court to vacate the Clean Power Plan or simply declined to defend it, obviating the lengthy procedure needed to rescind the rule by way of executive action. But judicial precedent suggests a motion to vacate would be denied, 129 and the intervenors in support of the rule would also likely continue to defend the rule. Indeed, on 5 April 2017, a coalition of 17 states, six municipalities and the District of Columbia filed opposition to the motion to hold the cases in abeyance, arguing that the case 'is ripe for decision now' and that a decision from the court would 'resolve critical live disputes over the scope of the Clean Air Act that will not only determine the enforcement of the Clean Power Plan, but also affect any reconsideration or revision of the Rule that EPA may undertake.' 130 Among the main issues at dispute is whether the Clean Air Act affords the EPA authority to regulate emissions from existing sources under more than one provision, and whether the 'best system of emissions reduction' can be based on actions that cannot be taken by each compliance entity alone, such as shifting dispatch from coal-to gas-fired electricity generation. Finally, the administration could seek to undermine the effect of President Obama's regulatory legacy by exercising its discretionary enforcement powers and refusing to enforce compliance obligations. In that case, however, the regulations would remain in full effect, affording stakeholders and other persons standing to initiate judicial proceedings -for instance a citizen suit under Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Act -against the relevant agency or alleged violators to enforce those obligations. Also, while laxity in the enforcement of environmental rules has been used as a political strategy under earlier administrations, it has practical limitations, as most companies in affected sectors will still follow the law and protect their public reputation. A casual approach to enforcement will therefore only afford partial relief to compliance entities, and entail new and undesirable uncertainty. For all the discussion about the scope of regulatory rollback facing US climate policy, it is also important to bear in mind the constitutional limits on federal powers in the area of climate change, as well as the role of market dynamics and fundamentals in driving the reduction of carbon emissions in North America. Under the US Constitution, both the federal and state governments enjoy some exclusive powers in the areas of energy and environmental policy, and exercise other powers in common.
132 As a result, climate legislation and executive rulemaking in the US form part of a dynamic and evolving tapestry of federal, state and local action, 133 with a periodically shift- Still, the outsized influence of dynamic market forces on changes in US emissions should not be ignored, and may ultimately disprove conservative forecasts as it has so frequently in the past.
138 Outpacing overall emissions abatement, emissions from electricity generation are currently at their lowest level since 1993, another major trend not predicted only some years ago. Over two thirds of those reductions are ascribed to fuel switching from coal to natural gas, a result of falling gas prices made possible by the rapid growth in supply from increasingly efficient hydraulic fracturing practices. 139 A corollary of this competition between coal and gas is falling demand for coal, which has declined 27% since 2005 and significantly weakened the coal mining industry, along with its employment potential. 140 Given that many executive actions surveyed earlier in this article directly promote the production and use of hydrocarbons, including shale gas, it is difficult to see how President Trump can nonetheless achieve his campaign promise of spurring a revival of the coal sector.
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Adding to the competitive pressures facing coal is another sector in which innovation and scale are rapidly lowering prices: renewable energy. In 2016 alone, the US saw installation of nearly 15 GW of new solar photovoltaic generating capacity, outpacing any other source of new generation.
142 With deployment increasingly independent from policy support, movement by many US states to expand their renewable energy mandates, and public investment in research and development continuing in other parts of the world even as the US might cut back federal funds, the global market for renewable energy is unlikely to lose momentum. If any single technology will suffer from a potential rescission or weakening of the Clean Power Plan, it is nuclear energy, which is likewise facing competitive pressures and would have stood to benefit from the regulatory incentive for low-carbon energy generation. Adding the risk that future administrations will reinstate any carbon constraints withdrawn by the Trump administration, 144 it is unsurprising that utilities mostly expect a sustained transition to renewable energy and natural gas, and are planning their investment decisions accordingly. 145 Overall, the federal climate regulations that now stand to be reviewed and possibly withdrawn are not, thus, the main drivers of recent US renewable energy growth and GHG emissions reductions as much as shifting market fundamentals and state action. In fact, even before the Clean Power Plan could take effect, a majority of states -including several states that have been strongly opposed to the regulation and joined judicial proceedings against it -had been on track to achieving their state targets, again driven mostly by subnational policies and market forces. 146 Multiple interrelated uncertainties will make it difficult or even impossible to determine the precise extent, but there is definitely truth to the argument that much of President Obama's climate legacy merely traced and locked in fundamental trends that were already underway.
147
On the margin, admittedly, regulatory relief from the reform agenda of the current administration may make some coal companies economically more viable, and may help delay the retirement of older thermal generation capacity. Increased exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) may also result in higher domestic prices, temporarily reversing some of the fuel switching effects observed in recent years.
148
Should that trend amplify over time, rules like the Clean Power Plan and the New Source Performance Standards would have played an important, but ultimately hypothetical, role as hedges against a coal revival driven by evolving market fundamentals. Still, it does not negate the argument that federal climate regulations played a subordinate role to market dynamics and state or local action in driving recent emission reductions. For international observers, that may provide scarce consolation, given how much less predictable and properly documented these latter factors are. Annulment of regulations such as the Clean Power Plan may therefore have a greater impact on the political dynamics of international climate cooperation than is warranted by their actual mitigation effect, a possibility discussed in the next subsection.
International Cooperation and the Paris Agreement
In contrast to its restless pace when it comes to rolling back domestic climate polices, the new administration has offered far less guidance on the future direction of foreign policy and international cooperation. US bilateral engagement with China in recent years is often credited with facilitating passage of the Paris Agreement, adding that breakthrough in international climate diplomacy to the legacy of for- see extensive amendments as it passes through Congress, there has yet to be a clear statement from the White House about whether the US will formally renounce the Paris Agreement and the broader climate regime, or remain -possibly passive -participants. Different pathways can lead to a formal withdrawal from the climate regime. For the Paris Agreement, the process is detailed in Article 28, which allows parties to pull out at 'any time after three years' from the date on which the agreement entered into force for them, with effect 'upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt … of the notification of withdrawal'. 154 Given that the Paris Agreement entered into force for the US on 4 November 2016, the earliest date by which the latter could notify its intention to withdraw would be 4 November 2019, allowing the withdrawal to take effect on 4 November 2020, towards the end of President Trump's current term in office. Alternatively, the US could formally withdraw from the UNFCCC pursuant to its Article 25, which describes a very similar process. Because the UNFC-CC has been in force for the US since 21 March 1994, 155 the withdrawal could be notified immediately, allowing it to take effect within one year. Both treaties specify that a withdrawal from the UNFCCC -as the 'mother convention' -will also entail automatic withdrawal from its subsidiary treaties, which includes the Paris Agreement. Although some commentators have suggested that exiting the UNFCCC constitutes 'an executive branch power' that does not require Congressional approval or ratification, 156 it bears remembering that the UNFCCC was ratified unanimously by the US Senate, suggesting that the domestic procedure will depend on whether a withdrawal is considered a 'political question' and thus a prerogative of the President, or whether the same Senate voting procedure that already governed the original ratification applies. 157 Rather than withdraw, the US could also significantly weaken its pledged mitigation effort, although this would arguably violate the progression duty under the Paris Agreement.
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Finally, an informal option for the US to disengage from the international climate regime would consist in simply ignoring the voluntary pledges made under the Paris Agreement, and adopting a passive or obstructionist approach to participation.
If the new administration chooses any of the foregoing options, and especially if it opts for a formal withdrawal from the UNFCCC, it will likely incur a substantial diplomatic cost. Such a move might dam-age the international reputation of the US and its perceived reliability as an international actor, and repercussions might even spill over into other policy agendas in which the current administration has a stronger interest, such as trade, immigration or defence. 159 One question that will invariably emerge in light of the domestic climate policy reversal is whether the US can achieve its pledged contribution of reducing US GHG emissions in 2025 by 26% to 28% compared to 2005 levels, 160 something observers have said to be contingent on full implementation of the Clean Power Plan and a suite of other Obama-era policies now threatened with rescission.
161
Whether lacking ambition by the US might provide an excuse for other countries to ignore their commitments or weaken future pledges, as some fear, 162 is difficult to predict. Several influential actors in international climate diplomacy, including China and India, have at least verbally stated an intention to uphold their climate ambitions irrespective of continued US participation. 163 Absent US leadership on climate change, other nations might even seek to fill the ensuing void: Europe may be too preoccupied with internal crises to resume its earlier role as a champion of international climate policy ambition, 164 but emerging nations such as China might perceive a stronger role in the process as a strategic opportunity. 165 Some observers have expressed optimism that the US will not surrender its leadership role on climate change, however, in which case it becomes particularly important for foreign partners to understand the domestic realities described in the previous sections and keep them separate from the political rhetoric dominating much of the current debate; in diplomatic relations, after all, perceptions do matter.
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IV. Outlook
Following the recent election, a single party now holds the presidency and controls the 115 th Congress, having majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Republicans also hold a majority of governorships and state legislatures, affording them a concentration of power that will enable greater transformational change than in many prior decades. But Donald Trump, effectively the leader of the Republican Party, brings a brand of nationalist populism that sets him apart from recent presidencies. While climate policy has long been an issue that elicits open hostility among many conservatives, the new president and his cabinet have been described as a 'triumph of climate denial', 167 dispensing with any remaining hesitation to oppose climate actionand even the acknowledgment of climate scienceon political grounds. As the impacts of a warming at-A New Direction for US Climate Policy mosphere become increasingly evident in the US 168 and surveys show expanding concern about climate change, 169 the underlying politics remain as partisan as ever.
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For the US response to climate change, one might expect this confluence of political power and unfettered partisanship to result in a terminal setback, but closer scrutiny shows that the outlook is likely more nuanced. A system of checks and balances and federal allocation of powers that dates back to well before anthropogenic climate change first became an issue may afford existing climate action surprising resilience against an ideological assault. Pending a legislative amendment or judicial determination that relieves the administration of its statutory obligation to regulate GHG emissions, for instance, the EPA will arguably find itself in a vulnerable position whenever it seeks to weaken or repeal existing executive rules, and could be forced to offer a reasoned argument why the growing body of scientific evidence on the reality and impacts of climate change nonetheless justifies scaling back action. Other federal agencies are bound by similar mandates, such as the DOT with its requirement to issue fuel economy standards under federal energy legislation. Challenging the legal basis in all cases would require overturning established case law of the Supreme Court or overcoming a filibuster with a supermajority in the Senate.
More likely, given the lengthy administrative process of notice and comment rulemaking and the likelihood of subsequent litigation, executive efforts to reverse climate regulation will merely have the effect of delaying progress, which translates into lost time for climate mitigation and adaptation, and a temporary reprieve for those opposing action. An inevitable companion of these delays is regulatory uncertainty, the natural antagonist of strategic investment decisions such as those required to achieve long-term decarbonisation of the economy. While less dramatic than outright reversal of climate action, delays and uncertainty represent a tangible -if not terminal -setback. Ironically, with the appointment of Neil M Gorsuch to the US Supreme Court, President Trump has installed an opponent of the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference to agency interpretations, 171 increasing the likelihood of judicial scrutiny of his executive actions. Around the same time the Chevron doctrine was being formulated, Merrick B Garland, chief judge of the influential US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit and President Obama's unsuccessful nominee for the same Supreme Court seat, helped define the standard of judicial review for rescission of agency regulations. 172 Deregulation was on the agenda of the EPA, then headed by Gorsuch's mother, Anne M Gorsuch, who had overseen the largest budget cuts to date at her agency. Cognisant of how history can repeat itself, federal agencies in the Trump administration should beware of executive actions that might appear arbitrary or capricious, or that incur unreasonable delays in the fulfilment of statutory obligations. Any federal lacunae left in the wake of regulatory reform are where subnational activism and the force of market fundamentals will be most apparent. States adopting ambitious mitigation targets or rapidly maturing markets for renewable energy technologies can each achieve far greater climate progress than fragmented agency regulations based on contested authorities, especially where these largely reflect fundamental trends that would have unfolded anyway. Unable to fully reverse even the disputed climate legacy of his predecessor, 173 Donald Trump's deregulatory activism will likely be remembered more for its symbolic bluster and populist rhetoric than actual substantive achievements. But measured against the level of policy ambition needed to achieve meaningful decarbonisation in North America, which would not only require strict enforcement of existing climate regulations, but also their rapid acceleration and expansion across all areas of the economy, it becomes clear that the delays, the policy uncertainty and the weakening or selective withdrawal of agency actions could be devastating precisely because they are so far removed from the required policy trajectory, a course even President Obama was unable to hold. 174 Instead of building and improving on the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Trump seems bent on ensuring that future administrations will have to start their climate policy agenda from scratch. Of particular concern are the cuts to early stage research and development, an area which markets -for all their current success in increasing the uptake of renewable energy and other sustainable technologies -do not typically allocate sufficient resources to. When considering the inordinate amount of time, effort and resources invested in elaborating some of the regulations and orders that are now being challenged, the scale of this setback becomes evident. Some changes, moreover, such as the passage of disapproval resolutions based on the CRA or severely curtailed agency budgets and staff capacities, 175 will have a lasting impact beyond the current administration and constrain the ability of more progressive successors to rebuild a robust climate policy framework.
When it comes to US participation in international climate cooperation, care must be taken to distinguish political rhetoric at the federal level from fundamental drivers and the formidable impact of subnational actors, especially when these are energized by a perceived leadership vacuum in the national capital. America's Madisonian model of government ensures that climate progress will continue, even if it is less visible and more heterogeneous than it was during the last administration. Still, the power to define foreign policy rests with the executive branch, and that comes with numerous opportunities for obstruction, as exemplified by early tensions in a Ministerial Meetings of the Group of Seven (G7). 176 Severely diminished contributions to international climate finance would have a measurable impact on the political dynamic in international climate negotiations, and a disengaged US may also have a chilling effect on the stocktaking and periodic review processes under the Paris Agreement. But to assume that the US will formally withdraw from the international climate regime is premature, despite the attendant campaign promises: not only is there disagreement about the benefits of such withdrawal within the innermost circle of presidential advisers, but even the unlikeliest candidates have come forward to advocate for continued engagement, such as coal sector executives. 177 A meeting of senior advisers and cabinet officials scheduled for the second half of April will offer more guidance on administration policy regarding continued participation in the Paris Agreement.
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History can be a useful guide when trying to see beyond the uncertainty surrounding a new and, in this case, remarkably unpredictable administration. Periods of regulatory activism followed by a deregulation reflex are not new in the evolutionary arc of US environmental policy. Alternative energy and conservation policies during the Carter administration gave way to frenzied deregulation and severe EPA budget cuts under President Reagan; attempts to pass a national energy tax and foster international engagement during the Clinton presidency were succeeded by withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and a period of domestic and foreign climate inaction under George W. Bush. In the end, it may be that
